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FROM NEW YORK TO SASKATOON
Doug Surtees*
In 1969, the New York Mets won the World Series and New
York State passed a new not-for-profit law.  Most people in Saska-
toon, Saskatchewan would have been tuned in to the first of these
events while being completely unaware of the latter.  Today, the
Mets as World Series champions is at best a distant memory while
people in Saskatoon and throughout Saskatchewan continue to be
influenced by the legal work that went into creating New York’s
1969 Not-for-Profit Corporation Law.
I. NEW YORK STATE’S BUSINESS CORPORATION LAW
A challenge for any jurisdiction designing a system that creates
and regulates nonprofit organizations is balancing efficiency (both
for the state and for the nonprofit corporation) against flexibility
for and accountability of the nonprofit corporation.
New York’s journey to create an entirely new legislative regime
to govern nonprofit corporations began in 1956 when the New
York legislature established a joint legislative committee at the re-
quest of the Committee on Corporation Law of the New York State
Bar Association.1  The joint committee “was empowered to make a
comprehensive study of the body of law, statutes, decisional law
and legal literature of the state pertaining in any manner to corpo-
rations organized or which may affect corporations to be organized
within the State of New York.”2  The joint committee, being legisla-
tive in nature, recognized that it must “effect the broadest possible
participation in the project by all interested groups.”3
The joint committee adopted what was called a study ap-
proach, rather than a drafting approach, to legislation.  That is, it
chose to undertake a broad research program prior to any draft-
ing.  The joint committee began by studying the then-existing law,
determining its problems, their causes, and potential solutions
tried in other jurisdictions.  The results of this study were circu-
* B.A., B.Ed., LLB, LL.M., Assistant Professor of Law, College of Law, University
of Saskatchewan in Saskatoon, Saskatchewan.
1 Robert S. Lesher, Revision of the New York Corporation Statutes, 14 BUS. LAW. 807,
807–08 (Apr. 1959).
2 Id. at 808.
3 Id. at 809.
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lated for comment and criticism prior to any drafting.4  The joint
committee was assisted in its work by a research advisory subcom-
mittee that had representation from each law school in New York
State.5
This approach to law reform was a conscious effort to create a
process designed to encourage participation from all sides.6  The
joint committee was determined to utilize that process to recom-
mend an overall revision to the corporate law of New York.  The
structure of New York corporate law would change from “trunk”
arrangements to a unified business corporation law.7  “Trunk” ar-
rangements refer to a structure where the general corporate law is
visualized as a trunk of a tree and a number of related statutes that
govern specific types of corporations are visualized as branches.  A
single statute that would contain the law relevant to the organiza-
tion of a business corporation would replace this complex
structure.
New York passed its new Business Corporation Law in 1961,
and it was made effective April 1, 1963.8  The joint committee con-
tinued to study the law and recommended some subsequent fine-
tuning amendments.  The joint committee also made plans to
study New York’s Membership Corporations Law in order to evalu-
ate the need for a nonprofit corporation statute.9  The enlightened
approach taken towards reviewing and modernizing New York’s
Business Corporation Law would later be applied to nonprofit cor-
porations as well.10
4 Id. at 813.
5 Id. at 815.
6 Id. at 809.
7 Id. at 812.
8 Robert S. Lesher, Introduction to Symposium on New York Business Corporation Law,
11 BUFF. L. REV. 429, 429 (1961–1962).
9 Id. at 437.
10 That the Not-for-Profit Corporation Law work was seen by the committee as a
continuation of the joint committee’s efforts is apparent from Chairman Warren An-
derson’s foreword to the committee’s Thirteenth Interim Report.  J. LEGIS. COMM. TO
STUDY REVISION OF CORP. LAW, THIRTEENTH INTERIM REP., 1982–83, at 7 (1969). The
Committee’s Not-for-Profit work was described as “Program III” of the
Committee’s overall plan for the revision of the corporate laws of New
York, Program I having been completed with the enactment of the Busi-
ness Corporation Law and Program II having been accomplished by the
revisions of the corporate portions of the Banking Law, Insurance Law,
Railroad Law, Transportation Corporations Law, and Cooperative Cor-
porations Law.
Id.
2006] FROM NEW YORK TO SASKATOON 431
II. NEW YORK’S NOT-FOR-PROFIT CORPORATIONS LAW
Some jurisdictions use the term “nonprofit” while others use
the term “not-for-profit.”11  The New York legislation uses the term
“not-for-profit.”  The explanatory memoranda that accompanied
the bill when it was enacted informs its readers that the term non-
profit corporation “suggests that the corporation either does not or
may not earn any profit.”12  Of course, if such a suggestion were
made, it would be false.  These corporations are certainly entitled
to maintain their spending at a level lower than their revenue and
thus show a profit.  Indeed, it would be hard to imagine their long-
term survival if they did not.  I disagree with the joint committee’s
distinction, not because of what is said, but because of what is not
said.  The inference in the memorandum is that the term not-for-
profit does not suggest that the corporation either does not or may
not earn a profit.  It has been my experience that most people who
have not studied the area misconstrue both terms, and most peo-
ple who have studied the area do not misconstrue either term.  I
am comforted that Professor Howard Oleck also failed to see a dis-
tinction between the terms.13
Nonprofit enabling legislation must balance many competing
values.  To do so, the joint committee organized its plan to mod-
ernize New York’s law into phases.  These phases facilitated wide
consultation by presenting the bar, state and federal agencies, user
groups, and the public with an opportunity for input at the appro-
priate phase of development.14  After the initial exploratory phase
there were four other phases to the committee’s work: organiza-
tion, research, drafting, and legislation.15
The organizational phase included retaining the subcommit-
tee structure, which had been used in the previous review of busi-
ness law.  Subcommittees and advisory committees included
connections to the New York State Bar Association, the Association
of the Bar of the City of New York, the American Bar Association,
state departments and agencies, as well as foundations.16  In addi-
tion, the joint legislative committee staff attempted to make other
11 I must admit that I have never been one to see a distinction between the terms.
Therefore, I shall use the terms interchangeably throughout this Article.
12 N.Y. NOT-FOR-PROFIT CORP. LAW, memorandum no. 1, art. I (2004).
13 HOWARD L. OLECK & MARTHA E. STEWART, NON PROFIT CORPORATIONS, ORGANI-
ZATIONS AND ASSOCIATIONS 11–12 (6th ed. 1994).
14 Id. at 15–18.
15 J. LEGIS. COMM. TO STUDY REVISION OF CORP. LAW, supra note 10, at 15.
16 Id. at 15–17.
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groups affected by the change in law aware of the process.17
In the research phase, the joint committee produced eighty-
two research reports18 and undertook studies on particular top-
ics.19  The joint committee received a large number of comments20
and placed a high value on the comments it received, saying: “We
are not able to overstate the value of these comments to our staff
work.  They represented a broad experience in the field.  In many
cases they represented the views of specialists who had access to
information which was unavailable from ordinary sources.”21
During the drafting phase, the joint committee continued to
receive input.  It circulated the draft legislation “to as many inter-
ested persons as we could locate.”22  In addition to receiving com-
ments,23 the joint committee held three advisory conferences,
which were open to every member of the advisory groups.24
Finally during the legislative phase, the joint committee held
two public hearings on the proposed legislation.  Even at this stage,
amendments to the bill were made.25  By facilitating broad partici-
pation by a wide range of groups with an interest in the subject, the
joint committee ensured that a diversity of viewpoints would come
to light and a studied, appropriate balance amongst competing in-
terests would be reached.  Perhaps this is why the basic approach to
regulating nonprofits developed in New York was so appropriate in
a place like Saskatchewan, a Canadian province of a million people
spread over a quarter of a million square miles, which is different
from New York in so many ways.
New York began its review of nonprofit law in 1963.26  At the
time, New York law permitted the incorporation of membership
corporations, which allowed incorporation for any lawful business
purpose.27  As a result, it was not possible to form a nonprofit cor-
17 Id. at 17.  “Most of the special types of groups affected by the proposed law have
been either formally or informally contacted by our staff.” Id.
18 Id. at 31–33.
19 Id. at 34–35.
20 Id. at 18.  “Space will not permit the reproduction or even the listing of the
many constructive comments which our committee has received on our various re-
search and drafting materials.” Id.
21 Id.
22 Id.
23 Id. at 36–45.
24 Id. at 18.
25 Id.
26 Robert S. Lesher, The Non-Profit Corporation—A Neglected Stepchild Comes of Age, 22
BUS. LAW. 951, 956 (July 1967).
27 Id. at 953.
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poration for a business (or profit) purpose.28
III. CANADA’S NOT-FOR-PROFIT CORPORATIONS ACT
In Canada, it is possible for nonprofit corporations to incorpo-
rate either provincially or federally.  The Canadian government,
like New York State, reviewed its business corporation law and sub-
sequently set its sights on modernizing the provisions that facili-
tated the incorporation of federal nonprofit corporations.  What
was then known as the Department of Consumer and Corporate
Affairs (now Industry Canada) published a two-volume report in
1974 called Proposals for a New Not-for-Profit Corporations Law for Can-
ada.29  It was authored by Professor Peter Cumming.  Volume One
explained the rationale for the specific recommendations, and Vol-
ume Two was the proposed legislation.
The work done in New York State was immensely important in
influencing the Canadian federal report.  Professor Peter Cum-
ming and others involved in preparing the federal report were
clearly most influenced by Robert Lesher, the chief counsel for the
New York joint committee, and the New York legislation which re-
sulted from its work.  In his preface to the report dated September
1973, Professor Cumming wrote:
There is relatively little literature in respect to not-for-profit cor-
porations, particularly in Canada, as compared with the exten-
sive literature on business corporation law.  Because of this
paucity of literature in respect to not-for-profit corporations, I
am particularly grateful to Mr. Robert S. Lesher, Chief Counsel
to the New York Joint Legislative Committee for making availa-
ble to me the comprehensive study underlying the major revi-
sions made in the not-for-profit corporations law of New York
state in 1969.  Mr.  Lesher also gave . . . considerably of his time,
notwithstanding an extremely busy schedule, in providing per-
sonally the benefit of his views on this area of the law.  An appre-
ciation of the underlying premises in respect to not-for-profit
corporations, and the origin of many of the ideas expressed in
this report, came from reading Mr.  Lesher’s insightful article
“The Non-Profit Corporation—A Neglected Stepchild Comes of
Age.”[30]  This report is heavily indebted to this article.  Ac-
knowledgment in respect to Mr.  Lesher’s insights, ideas, argu-
ments and language is given only generally in this preface,
28 Id. at 953–54.
29 Peter A. Cumming, Proposals for a Not-for-Profit Corporations Law for Canada, in 1 &
2 NOT-FOR-PROFIT CORPORATIONS LAW (1974).
30 Lesher, supra note 26.
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rather than specifically throughout this report, simply because
Mr.  Lesher’s landmark article pervades so much of the report.
The New York legislation is referred to often throughout the
Commentary as it is the most recent and innovative legislation
in the subject area.31
The draft Canada Not-for-Profit Corporations Act32 was even-
tually introduced into Parliament, but the bill died on the order
paper when Parliament was prorogued.  The Act, however, did
serve as the basis for what was to become Saskatchewan’s nonprofit
legislation.33  The body of work that gave rise to it, as modified over
time, continues to be influential.34
Prior to the passage of the Non-Profit Corporations Act, Sas-
katchewan had the Societies Act.35  The repealed Act authorized
societies to be incorporated where the society’s objectives were “of
a benevolent, religious, charitable, philanthropic, educational, ag-
ricultural, scientific, artistic, social, professional, fraternal, sport-
ing, athletic or other useful nature.”36
These “legitimate” objectives were narrowed down so as to ex-
pressly prohibit a society from being incorporated under the act
“for the purpose of carrying on any trade, industry or business.”37
If a group did not fit within the Societies Act, it would require a
special act of the legislature to incorporate, or else the group
would have to incorporate under different legislation, such as the
business corporation law or the law governing co-operatives.  As in
New York, the government of the day moved to legislation, which
would allow incorporation as of right.
IV. INCORPORATION AS OF RIGHT
Saskatchewan allows incorporation as of right.  Just like New
31 1 CUMMING, supra note 29, at iii (citation omitted).
32 The Non-Profit Corporations Act, 1995, N-4.2 S.S. (2005).
33 ONTARIO LAW REFORM COMM’N, REPORT ON THE LAW OF CHARITIES 1 (1996),
available at http://www.mtroyal.ca/nonprofit/lawofcharities.pdf.
34 The authors of the Ontario Law Reform Commission’s ‘Report on The Law of
Charities’ after referring to nonprofit law reform efforts in the United States and
Canada said:
We have looked carefully at these developments and, in our following
commentary and reform proposals, rely most heavily on the statutes in
Saskatchewan, California, and New York, the proposed legislation in Al-
berta, as well as the American Bar Association Model Act.  The Saskatch-
ewan Act and the Model Act have been particularly influential.
Id. at 521.
35 Societies Act, S-53 R.S.S. (1978) (repealed 1984).
36 Id. § 4.
37 Id. § 5.
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York moved away from a requirement for judicial and later admin-
istrative discretionary approval,38 Saskatchewan also simplified the
process of incorporation.  Under the reformed legislation, the
nonprofit corporation is merely seen as a vehicle.  Like New York,
Saskatchewan rejected the outdated belief that simply because a
nonprofit corporation existed, members of the public would be-
lieve the organization was certified or sanctioned by the state as
having met some sort of superior altruistic rating.  The Department
of Consumer and Corporate Affairs (Canada) Report makes the
interesting observation that the only justification for believing a
nonprofit corporation has met some sort of state screening test is
the old-fashioned requirement for permitting incorporation after a
state representative exercises a discretionary power to grant incor-
poration.39  In other words, removing the discretionary power of
state officials to grant incorporation also removes the reason for
anyone to believe the mere existence of a nonprofit corporation is
evidence of its altruistic nature.40  This approach to the nonprofit
corporation separates the existence of the corporation from tax
and other benefits that may or may not accrue to the nonprofit
corporation and from naming restrictions which may also be in
place.41
This approach has received some criticism.  In speaking of the
then-new New York Types C and D corporations, Professor Oleck
said, “The utter confusion of charitable and profit-making motives
and operations, that they are sure to encourage, will be a
nightmare for state and federal regulatory agents.”42  He also said
that “[o]ne provision [of the new act] eliminates from New York’s
statute one of its best features respecting non-profit organization
law—the requirement of scrutiny by a judge.”43  Later, Professor
Oleck toned down his language, although he still referred to the
New York statute as “radical”44 and said the provision for Type C
(mixed profit/nonprofit) corporations “approves, in effect, the
view that nonprofits may be simply another means for taking
38 See NORMAN I. SILBER, A CORPORATE FORM OF FREEDOM: THE EMERGENCE OF THE
NONPROFIT SECTOR, at 136–38 (2001).
39 1 CUMMING, supra note 29, § 49, at 13.
40 Contra SILBER, supra note 38, at 17.
41 See The Non-Profit Corporations Regulations, 1997, N-4.2 Reg. 1 S.S. §§ 7, 8
(2005).
42 HOWARD L. OLECK, NON-PROFIT CORPORATIONS, ORGANIZATIONS AND ASSOCIA-
TIONS 46 (3d ed. 1974).
43 Id. at 48.
44 OLECK & STEWART, supra note 13, at 11.
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profit; a most doubtful policy.”45
In creating a system for the establishment of nonprofit corpo-
rations, there is a legitimate state concern for adding in safeguards
to ensure that the nonprofit corporation does not distribute profit
to members as if they were shareholders.  This is because at least
part of that profit exists due to benefits conferred on the nonprofit
organization by its nonprofit status.  The purpose in conferring
these benefits is presumably to increase the capital available for the
nonprofit corporation to reinvest in achieving its purpose.  Where
nonprofit corporations have a public benefit purpose, we all bene-
fit.  Similarly, many jurisdictions, including New York and Saskatch-
ewan, appear to believe that the societal benefit in permitting
groups to pool their capital and work together for their mutual
benefit justifies encouraging these types of nonprofit corporations
in the enabling legislation.  Arguably, the same belief justifies ex-
tending tax deductions to business corporations for capital rein-
vested in their business pursuits.  The integrity of the nonprofit
corporation enabling legislation requires that the legislation both
prohibit the payment of profits to members and possess an effec-
tive mechanism to enforce that prohibition.  The larger the non-
profit sector is, the more important this becomes.  The re-thinking
of what it means to be a nonprofit corporation would require a re-
conceptualizing of the state’s enforcement mechanism or supervi-
sory technique.
Enabling legislation that only permits the incorporation of
nonprofit corporations to carry out certain listed purposes requires
the significant exercise of discretionary power by a state official.
Under the former Societies Act, a society could be incorporated
where it had “objects of a benevolent, religious, charitable, philan-
thropic, educational, agricultural, scientific, artistic, social, profes-
sional, fraternal, sporting, athletic, or other useful nature”46
provided it not be for the “purpose of carrying on any trade, indus-
try or business.”47  Enabling legislation that permits incorporation
as of right, provided some minimal requirements and basic proce-
dure are followed, can dramatically reduce the discretionary power
exercised by state officials at the incorporation stage.  This in-
creases the efficiency and ease of use of the incorporation system,
as well as the flexibility available to incorporators.  The Saskatche-
wan legislation goes further than its New York counterpart and im-
45 Id. at 94.
46 Societies Act § 4.
47 Id. § 5.
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bues nonprofit corporations with the powers and privileges of a
natural person.48  Provided that the state’s legitimate goal of ad-
ding safeguards to ensure that nonprofit corporations do not dis-
tribute profits to members as if they were shareholders can still be
met, these are very positive developments.  This objective can be
achieved more effectively by imposing obligations on those
charged with managing the affairs of nonprofit corporations and
by clearly stating the rights and powers of those affected by the
activities of nonprofit corporations.
By emphasizing control during a nonprofit corporation’s op-
erations, the legislation focused attention on the true prohibition.
Our common concern regarding nonprofit corporations is not to
apply special regulations governing how profit may be earned, but
only to govern how that profit—once earned—may be used.
Lesher urged that certain types of expenditures by nonprofit cor-
porations should be subject to limitations.  First, Lesher urged that
there should be a provision to allow the identification of members
and real parties in interest, and a basic prohibition against gener-
ally distributing profits to members.49  Second, he identified six
other areas where he felt expenditures could be used in a way con-
trary to the nature of a nonprofit corporation.50  These expendi-
tures include improper loans to insiders, payments for debt or
other special payments, compensation of directors and officers, in-
cidental benefits to insiders, improper benefits to outsiders, and
distribution of assets on dissolution.51  Although there may well be
room for improvement, these matters are largely regulated by rules
governing disclosure by directors,52 their duty of care,53 and their
personal liability for improper payments.54  Directors and members
are only entitled to reasonable remuneration under the legisla-
tion.55  Recently, the Canada Revenue Agency posted annual re-
turns of registered charities on its web site.56  These annual returns
make some information readily accessible to everyone in the world,
including a list of directors, basic financial information, as well as
the salary ranges of the five highest-compensated positions with the
48 Non-Profit Corporations Act § 15.
49 Lesher, supra note 26, at 970.
50 Id. at 970–72.
51 Id.
52 Non-Profit Corporations Act § 107.
53 Id. § 109.
54 Id. § 105.
55 Id. § 112.
56 Canada Revenue Agency, http://www.cra-arc.gc.ca/tax/charities/online_list-
ings/canreg_interim-e.html (last visited Jan. 30, 2006).
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charity.  Fundamental to the legislation are rules facilitating mem-
ber access to information,57 including the use of corporate profits
to further corporate activities.58
The previous legislation in both New York and Saskatchewan
required five incorporators and saw the state exercising supervisory
discretionary power over the process.  New York made it easier to
incorporate by reducing this supervisory control, and Saskatche-
wan built upon this approach.  By permitting incorporation as of
right, Saskatchewan no longer requires a discretionary or quasi-ju-
dicial oversight role.  Under the reformed approach in Saskatche-
wan, any natural person who is of age, of sound mind, and who is
not bankrupt may incorporate a nonprofit corporation by merely
signing and delivering correctly completed articles of incorpora-
tion to the appropriate official.59  The articles of incorporation
provides the most basic information relating to the nonprofit cor-
poration: the corporation’s name; the location of its registered of-
fice; the classes and subdivisions of membership; a description of
their distinctive features; the conditions on which a membership
interest may be transferred (if permitted); the number of directors;
whether the corporation is a membership or a charitable corpora-
tion; any restrictions on its activities; and the identity of the person
entitled to the property of the corporation upon winding-up.60
The Saskatchewan legislation strives to achieve efficiency and
flexibility by adopting the same philosophical approach as the New
York legislation.  Efficiency is achieved for the state by creating a
nonprofit regime that is self-regulating to the greatest possible ex-
tent.  Efficiency is created for the nonprofit corporation by creat-
ing a system which emphasizes predictability and ease-of-use.  In
this regard, Saskatchewan’s implementation of two basic types or
classifications can be considered a substantial refinement of New
York’s four types, the selection of which still requires the exercise
of judgment.  Saskatchewan’s two possible classifications, while not
mutually exclusive, have the advantage of being ascertainable by
answering one basic question: Are the corporation’s activities pri-
marily for the benefit of its members or the public?
The New York statute moved the nonprofit corporation away
from being defined by its lack of business purpose and toward be-
57 Non-Profit Corporations Act § 21.
58 Id. § 30.
59 Id. § 5.
60 Id. § 6.  Winding-up is another term for “liquidation and dissolution of the cor-
poration.” Id.
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ing defined by its function.  The New York statute was re-conceptu-
alized, recognizing that, to use a cliché, “form follows function.”
The wide consultations undertaken by the joint committee resulted
in an approach that was determined to accommodate all legitimate
functions of nonprofits.  What was seen as legitimate was broad-
ened; the critical feature was not this broadening, however, but
rather the way in which the matter would be determined.  Under
the previous approach—which, to some extent, still exists in New
York—the nature of an activity would be characterized as legiti-
mate or not.  This can lead to difficult distinctions.  Under the
modern Saskatchewan approach, for example, a nonprofit corpo-
ration that chooses to limit its own activities is constrained from
pursuing lawful activities, making it possible for a nonprofit corpo-
ration to operate a restaurant, an office building, or a gas station.
By allowing incorporation as of right, the powers of nonprofit
corporations could be widened.  Accountability is achieved by facil-
itating a more clearly defined system of duties, liabilities, and pow-
ers primarily between directors and members.  With a better
method of ensuring accountability after incorporation, it becomes
possible to widen the powers of a nonprofit corporation while still
being reasonably assured that the state’s overall objectives can be
met.  This was done in Saskatchewan, where nonprofit corpora-
tions were given, in relevant respects, the rights and powers of a
natural person.  Nonprofits can exercise those powers beyond Sas-
katchewan’s borders to the extent permitted by the laws of the
other jurisdiction.61  Competing with business corporations and
earning a profit is no longer seen as taboo for nonprofit corpora-
tions.  This philosophy proved a good fit in Saskatchewan, with its
long history of cooperative development and Crown corpora-
tions.62  Some Crown corporations have historically been granted
monopolies, while others regularly compete with private
business.63
V. CATEGORIZING BY TYPE
Creating a statute with sufficient flexibility for nonprofits to
organize themselves is efficient for the state.  In New York, this
took the form of delineating types of nonprofit corporations that
could be formed.  Four types of nonprofit corporations are set out,
61 Id. § 15.
62 A Crown corporation is a state-owned company or enterprise.
63 See generally PAT REDIGER, THE CROWNS: A HISTORY OF PUBLIC ENTERPRISE IN SAS-
KATCHEWAN (2004).
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each of which was appropriate for different nonprofit activities and
carried different obligations and rights.64  So, in theory, the poten-
tial incorporator simply selects the type that best corresponds to
the purpose for which it wished to incorporate.  If the potential
incorporator wanted to form for a non-business purpose, such as
athletics or a professional association, it would form a Type A cor-
poration.  If it wished to form for a non-business purpose such as
cultural or literary purpose, it would form a Type B corporation.  If
it wished to form for a business purpose it would form a Type C
corporation.  Finally, if the formation of the corporation is author-
ized by another corporate law of New York, it might form a Type D
corporation.65  This innovative scheme of delineating by type was
seen as a central feature of the New York legislation.
“If the New York Not-for-Profit Corporation Law is destined
for primacy in its field,” one of its authors wishfully conjectured,
much of the credit would be due to the “careful and imaginative
drafting” of section 201:
For the first time, it provides the state with a rational
and well-balanced system of laws expressing a legisla-
tive philosophy which cannot fairly be labeled too per-
missive or too onerous.  It bridges frustrating gaps that
could not be spanned under the old law, codifies and
clarifies the rights and duties of members and their
managers, polishes and sharpens the state’s tools de-
signed to protect the public interest, gives elbow room
to the imaginative social planner, and provides for
greater financial flexibility while maximizing fiscal
responsibility.66
The proposed Canadian legislation drafted as part of the Con-
sumer and Corporate Affairs (Canada) Report in 1974 simplified
and built upon this “well-balanced system of laws.”  The recommen-
dation from this report was to have two types of federal nonprofit
corporations: charitable and membership.67  The “business pur-
pose” language was no longer used.  A charitable corporation was a
corporation that operated for public benefit, and a membership
corporation was a corporation that operated for member benefit.
In both cases, the incorporation had to be for a “non-pecuniary
purpose,” which was defined as a purpose other than making a
64 N.Y. NOT-FOR-PROFIT CORP. LAW § 201 (McKinney 2005).
65 Id.
66 SILBER, supra note 38, at 134 (quoting FRANK WHITE ET AL., NEW YORK CORPORA-
TIONS, at § 201.01 (1994)).
67 2 CUMMING, supra note 29, at 3.
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profit for the benefit of its members.  In addition, there were re-
strictions on transferring corporate property to members and di-
rectors.68  Although laid out in a complicated manner, these
restrictions basically required that in the case of winding-up a char-
itable corporation, the surplus assets must be distributed to Cana-
dian organizations having similar goals.69  Distribution of surplus
property of a membership corporation being wound-up was to be
done equally among the membership interests.70
The Saskatchewan legislation further simplified these two
types of memberships.  In Saskatchewan, a nonprofit corporation is
either a membership corporation, incorporated “to carry on activi-
ties that are primarily for the benefit of its members” or a charita-
ble corporation, incorporated “to carry on activities that are
primarily for the benefit of the public.”71  Restrictions on distribut-
ing corporate assets are dealt with elsewhere in the legislation.
The two types of nonprofit corporations possible in Saskatche-
wan are much more efficient for potential incorporators to use
than New York’s system, which recognizes four types of corpora-
tions.  Each type of Saskatchewan corporation comes with its own
obligations and entitlements.  Potential incorporators need only
know that their planned activities are to be primarily for their
members’ benefit or the public’s benefit to choose a corporation
type.  Unfortunately, the Saskatchewan legislature retained the
confusing names for the two types of nonprofit corporations as de-
scribed in the Consumer and Corporate Affairs (Canada) Report.
Both charitable corporations and membership corporations have
members.  This leads to confusion among members of the public
and indeed among members of the corporation.  Also, charitable
status in Canada—the ability to issue charitable tax-deductible re-
ceipts—is regulated under federal income tax law, not provincial
nonprofit law.  Therefore, a charitable nonprofit corporation may
or may not be a registered charity.  Nonprofit corporations that are
not registered charities cannot issue tax-deductible charitable do-
nation receipts.  Of course, any nonprofit corporation—or busi-
ness corporation for that matter—can issue a receipt for money
received, and this may be deductible as a business expense by the
donor.  It is unfortunate that more accurate names like “member-
68 Id. § 2.02(1), at 5; §§ 17.19(1),(2), at 60–61.
69 Id.
70 Id. § 17.19(6), at 61.
71 Non-Profit Corporations Act § 2(1).
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benefit corporation” and “public-benefit corporation” were not
used.  These names would have been less confusing to the public.
The New York legislation began the move toward defining the
nonprofit corporation by purpose rather than by activity.  The lim-
iting feature of the New York statute is the comparatively narrow
definition of purpose it used.  As Norman Silber wrote, “Each
‘type’ reflected a category of nonprofit endeavor that federal tax
law and prior experience suggested was distinguishable.”72  By fo-
cusing on a list of comparatively narrow purposes, however, the
New York statute has not made as much improvement as it might
have over its categorization by activity.  By using a broad purpose
test—member-benefit or public-benefit—Saskatchewan has built
upon what New York began.
VI. REGULATION
Nonprofit corporations of the same type will vary tremen-
dously in size, complexity, and sophistication.  Think of nonprofit
corporations that contribute to the quality of life in your own com-
munity.  Chances are you will be able to identify small volunteer
organizations like the local Home and School Association or Com-
munity Association, as well as very large complex organizations like
Easter Seals and the Red Cross.  Nonprofit organizations vary in
size and complexity in much the same way as business corpora-
tions.  To be efficient, a nonprofit enabling act must accommodate
a wide variety of organizations.  The previous Saskatchewan Socie-
ties Act was simple and short.  It contained only fifty-five sections
which covered a total of thirteen pages.
The result of such an overly brief enabling act was that incor-
porators had to create their own rules of governance and organiza-
tional structure.  This was typically done by bylaws.  Since bylaws
were for many purposes the only document that set out the basic
rules—and since the state was exercising more hands-on adminis-
trative functions—bylaws had to be filed with the incorporating
documents.73  Amendments to the bylaws are not effective until
filed.74  In keeping with reducing the supervisory role of the
state—where this could be done without compromising accounta-
bility—the modern Saskatchewan legislation does not require the
filing of bylaws.  Simplifying the administrative framework—and re-
lying on members and directors to govern their own affairs within
72 SILBER, supra note 38, at 134.
73 Societies Act § 9.
74 Id. § 13(1).
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prescribed limits—led to removing the requirement to file by-
laws—or to even to have them at all.  This is more efficient for the
state, and also for the nonprofit corporation.  The federal legisla-
tion in Canada still requires the filing of bylaws for federally incor-
porated nonprofit corporations.75  Some less sophisticated non-
profit corporations may be unaware of this or may simply forget to
file changes.  This will lead to confusion about which bylaws are
effective at a given time.
Like the New York legislation, Saskatchewan’s legislation seeks
to provide an overall framework establishing the powers, obliga-
tions, and liabilities of directors and members.  Directors’ duties
and members’ interests and rights would have to be spelled out in
a much more systematic manner if the legislation is to create a
nonprofit regime which is self-regulating to the greatest possible
extent.
Prior to modernization, the Saskatchewan legislation largely
left the matter of defining directors’ duties to the organization it-
self.  The Societies Act contained only the basic statement that “the
directors shall conduct the business and affairs, and may exercise
all the powers, of the society.”76  Otherwise, the content of direc-
tors’ duties was largely left to common law or the society’s bylaws.
Although the common law is of course still applicable, the modern
Saskatchewan legislation, like the New York legislation, spells out
specific responsibilities and liabilities of directors.  This change in
perspective on nonprofit corporations is well-described in the
Lesher article so influential to Professor Cumming.77  The ability of
nonprofit corporations to act in an expanded sphere of activity—
and the increased ability to raise capital—puts great responsibility
on directors and officers.  Lesher urged consideration of holding
directors and officers of nonprofit corporations to a duty of care
comparable to that of directors of business corporations with one
exception.78  Recognizing that directors of nonprofit corporations
often provide a public service, Lesher concluded that “the duty of
the director of the nonprofit corporation should be less exacting
lest the public-spirited citizen refrain from assuming the responsi-
bility as director.”79  Saskatchewan adopted a “business-like” duty of
care when it modernized its legislation.  Every director and officer
is required to comply with the legislation, the incorporating docu-
75 Canada Corporations Act, C-32 R.S.C. 155(2)(1970).
76 Societies Act § 36(2).
77 Lesher, supra note 26.
78 Id. at 969.
79 Id.
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ments, the organization’s bylaws, any unanimous member agree-
ment, and must “(a) act honestly and in good faith with a view to
the best interest of the corporation; and (b) exercise the care, dili-
gence and skill that a reasonably prudent person would exercise in
comparable circumstances.”80  It is interesting to note that, in
2003, Saskatchewan amended its legislation to limit the civil liabil-
ity of directors and officers where they were acting in good faith,
provided their act or omission did not constitute a provincial or
federal offense and the loss, which would otherwise give rise to lia-
bility, was not caused by their criminal or fraudulent misconduct.
This change would seem to bring Saskatchewan’s legislation in line
with Lesher’s 1967 recommendation.
Members’ interests were not well-delineated in the older legis-
lation.  The modern Saskatchewan legislation does a much more
thorough job.  Membership typically brings with it rights, not obli-
gations.  Generally, a member’s liability is limited to the extent of
the membership interest.  Members hold what might be thought of
as a supervisory power resulting from their associational interests81
and rights to access information,82 requisition a membership meet-
ing,83 make proposals,84 and remove directors.85  In the case of
charitable corporations, a right to access a “basic list” of the names
and addresses of the membership is conferred on the public gener-
ally.86  Any person may request it, and it must be furnished.87
Members provide the supervision which requires others to fulfill
their obligations.
For Lesher, the corporate commercial world provided gui-
dance on how to govern nonprofit corporations.  He reasoned that
these concepts could be adapted for the new purpose of moderniz-
ing nonprofit corporate governance.  Even in the 1960s, the corpo-
rate world recognized that there were certain locations within the
corporate framework where particular decisions should be made.
Visualizing these points as a ladder, Lesher listed them as follows:88
80 Non-Profit Corporations Act § 109.
81 Id. §§ 113–21.
82 Id. §§ 20–23.
83 Id. § 133.
84 Id. § 127.
85 Id. § 96.
86 Id. § 21.
87 Id. § 21(3)(b).
88 Lesher, supra note 26, at 967.
















In using the ladder-of-corporate-authority analysis, Lesher did
not merely describe what would be an appropriate structure, he
helped redefine the purpose and relationship of the rungs for non-
profit corporations.  As a result of re-thinking what a nonprofit cor-
poration should be, nonprofit organizations organized under
statutes influenced by Lesher’s work share a common develop-
ment.  The purpose of the statute became, in part, a way to enable
an effective and efficient system that imposed the minimum neces-
sary requirements on nonprofit corporations.  Administrative su-
pervision was no longer primarily made up of discretionary power.
The possibility of raising capital through new means, such as issu-
ing securities,89 and the concomitant participation of debt-holders
in certain decisions were envisioned as potential developments.90
The relationship between the members of a nonprofit corporation
and its directors—and the ability of the directors to rely on its exec-
utives and officers—became similar to that in the commercial cor-
porate world.  The relationship among all the rungs above
employees changes when we adopt this view, as opposed to the pre-
vious view that defines a nonprofit corporation primarily by the
restrictions one believes ought to be placed on its activities.  The
relationship with employees remains a matter outside corporate
law and therefore unaffected.91
89 Non-Profit Corporations Act § 25.
90 See Lesher, supra note 26, at 968.  “As the financial structures of non-profit cor-
porations become more complex and where the source of funds, such as a govern-
ment unit, assumes the position of debt holder, this rung in the ladder may become
more prominent.” Id.
91 Id. at 969.
446 NEW YORK CITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 9:429
Lesher described a concept of a nonprofit corporation as an
efficient, effective structure within which purposes beneficial to the
public or to the corporation’s members could be pursued.  This
new way of conceiving nonprofit corporations led to a series of
changes in the way restrictions on activities, liabilities, and duties
were viewed.  The essential characteristic of the nonprofit corpora-
tion was no longer the activity undertaken by that corporation, but
rather it was the use the corporation made of its profits—or what
Lesher termed the “limits on withdrawals of the proceeds of opera-
tions.”92  His view of what was possible for nonprofit corporations
led directly to major changes in New York and Saskatchewan non-
profit law.  Of course, significant differences certainly exist be-
tween the laws of these two jurisdictions.  Although both statutes
are the result of a common philosophy, they were implemented a
decade apart in different political systems and in different legal
contexts.  Both jurisdictions, however, share an understanding of
nonprofit corporations traceable to the work of Lesher and the
others who made up the joint committee at the end of the 1960s.
VII. RECONCEPTUALIZING THE NONPROFIT
It is my view that the process which began with re-thinking
New York’s corporate law, and then nonprofit corporation law,
necessarily led to a re-conception of several components of the law.
These in turn led to a new thinking about the appropriate relation-
ship between accountability on one hand and efficiency and ease
of use on the other.
Re-conceptualizing the nonprofit corporation necessarily led
to addressing the issues of incorporation as of right and increased
powers for nonprofit corporations.  After all, if a nonprofit corpo-
ration is seen as an entity with restrictions on the use of profit, it is
clearly neither intrinsically good nor bad.  Since the restrictions in
place safeguard against harm caused by the nonprofit corporation,
there is no need to unduly restrain the creation of such corpora-
tions.  The logic of incorporation by right becomes inescapable.  If
nonprofit corporations can incorporate as of right—and particu-
larly if nonprofit corporations are to be distinguishable from busi-
ness corporations based on the use of their funds for a certain
purpose instead of their activity—the increased power of nonprofit
corporations is a natural result.  This also raises the issue of
whether to create different types of nonprofit corporations.  Given
92 Id.
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the wide range of activity which would be available to nonprofit
corporations, it is understandable that some form of classification
would be called for by legislators.
Having considered these matters, it would be natural to ad-
dress increasing efficiency and ease-of-use by reducing the state’s
exercise of discretionary power in supervision.  As the state assumes
more of a screening function, it would be consistent to reduce con-
trols, like the required number of incorporators and documents
that must be filed.
Efficiency-enhancing changes could not be considered
responsibly without simultaneously looking at ways to increase ac-
countability and flexibility.  Consideration would have to be given
to better defining and clarifying the duties and liabilities of direc-
tors and others responsible for the management of the corpora-
tion.  The options available for a management structure would
have to be clarified, including the relationships among directors,
officers, and committees.  It may also include the ability of the
board to be bound by a unanimous members’ agreement, or the
ability to raise capital through certain mechanisms, such as issuing
securities.  Finally, it would be necessary to consider the role of
members as the holders of the ultimate authority in the nonprofit
corporation.  It is logical that such a process would lead to a defin-
ing and clarifying of the rights of members, including self-help
remedies that should be available to them.  This process might
look like the diagram on the following page.
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